• Follow FBA’s activities from the below list as ‘SEMINAR’, ‘THESIS DEFENSE’ or ‘OTHER’
  • Past seminars (between October 2010 & November 2017) are here
  • Use below –Choose a date using calendar– option to filter a different interval (starts from December 2017)

RECENT SEMINARS

Feb
9
Wed
2022
Online Seminar by Fikri Küçüksayacıgil
Feb 9 @ 9:00 am – 10:00 am
Online Seminar by Fikri Küçüksayacıgil
‘Planning Energy Transportation under Long-term Uncertainties’
by Fikri Küçüksayacıgil
University of California San Diego

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

Policy makers are supporting renewable energy goals in order to address global climate change. One impediment to reach these goals is constraints on infrastructure. For the electric power sector, transmission lines have proven to be important bottlenecks to further expansion of renewable energy. Transmission expansion investments have long lead times and are subject to numerous uncertainties in deregulated markets. Similarly, for the fuels sector, recent issues in transportation of renewable power equipment will likely slow down the pace of decarbonization. Shipping companies face backlogs of ship building orders at shipyards and increasing cost of ship building materials. They may need to look for alternatives of buying new ships (e.g., capacity expansion) to increase transportation capability. Capacity expansion on existing ships requires an investment during the initial design phase, which is paid off with the benefit of larger cargo spaces. Trade-off between initial cost and financial benefit of extra cargo space is a challenging problem under demand uncertainty. This talk tries to answer (i) how should transmission expansion investments be planned under demand and distributed generation uncertainties and (ii) how should shipping companies strike a balance between capital investments while building a ship and subordinate capacity expansion costs? It also addresses an ongoing work of least-cost expansion of transmission networks in the western U.S. to meet green energy goals under jurisdictional uncertainties.

Feb
25
Fri
2022
Online Seminar by Gülen Sarıal Abi
Feb 25 @ 1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
Online Seminar by Gülen Sarıal Abi
When Algorithms Harm: Consumers’ Responses following Algorithmic Bias
by Gülen Sarıal Abi
Copenhagen Business School

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

Algorithms are widely used in marketing contexts including segmentation and targeting, product recommendations, pricing and advertising. Despite the efficiency gained through algorithmic technologies, there is increasing concern that algorithms may be biased, resulting in unfair outcomes for members of some protected classes. We examine how consumers respond to a brand that uses an algorithm following algorithmic bias resulting in algorithmic discrimination toward members of their protected class. Extending developments in the social categorization literature and its role in discrimination, we propose that consumers will respond negatively to a brand when the output of an algorithm used by the brand results in discrimination (vs. preferential treatment) toward members of their protected class. Consumers’ perceptions of the extent to which the algorithm uses social categorization that humans use in their decision-making will mediate the negative responses following bias that results in discrimination (vs. preferential treatment). We further propose that three sources of algorithmic bias (i.e., technical, emergent, and preexisting) will moderate consumers’ responses to the brand using the algorithm following algorithmic discrimination (vs. preferential treatment). The results from one secondary data study and five pre-registered experiments support the proposed theory and hypotheses. The findings generate insights on algorithmic bias and extend the literature on algorithmic marketing and also generate actionable guidelines for managerial practice.

Mar
2
Wed
2022
Online Seminar by Canberk Üçel
Mar 2 @ 1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
Online Seminar by Canberk Üçel
“What Are the Drivers of (Low) Farm Productivity? Smallholder Coconut Farming in the Philippines.”
by Canberk Üçel
University of Pennsylvania

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

Increasing the productivity of Philippine smallholder coconut farms that are well below world standards could improve the livelihoods of 3.4 million farming families, most living in poverty. Government and international organizations have long promoted Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) that public research suggests would double farm productivity with little capital investment. I analyze unique data on the productivity and operations of two thousand farms in the Philippines to identify in unprecedented micro-detail best practices for five key operations: salt fertilizer use, mulching, pruning, weeding, and pest control. I find strong suggestive evidence that (1) blanket GAP recommendations for salt fertilizer use practices are not effective when farm environments vary, tailoring practices to which can yield 10% to 20% short-term productivity gains, and (1) the best practices for the other four operations, each of which can contribute between 5% and 30% greater farm productivity, differ from the respective GAPs in such micro-details as the minimum quantity of coconut husk (a common farm waste) per tree to apply as mulch. My results suggest that supporting organizations should focus on developing better customized farming advice for smallholders and assist farmers with the finer details of implementation, a course of action not currently preferred by the industry, but increasingly possible through emerging information technologies. Customized farming advice communicated in fine detail, extended beyond the Philippine context, could potentially improve the circumstances of more than two billion people worldwide whose incomes are dependent on smallholder farms.

Mar
4
Fri
2022
Online Seminar by Aycan Adrian Çorum
Mar 4 @ 4:30 pm – 5:30 pm
Online Seminar by Aycan Adrian Çorum
Governance by Regulation vs. Prices: Mitigating Short-Termism under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
by Aycan Adrian Çorum
Cornell University

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

I study a model of short-termism where a firm’s value is affected by the actions of its blockholder (e.g., an activist, or a manager). Each blockholder either has a project with positive NPV and can further increase the NPV by exerting effort, or has a project that destroys value. The blockholders can liquidate their stake in their respective firms before the NPV of their actions is realized by the market. This ability to exit creates opportunities for the blockholders to profit from a short-term increase in the stock price even when they are actually destroying value. I find that the existence of some value-destroying blockholders (up to a certain number) increases average firm value, because it motivates the value-creating blockholders to work much harder due to a fall in the exit price. Moreover, under endogenous entry, regulations that punish short-termism (e.g., raising short-term taxes) may result in a shorter investment duration by the value-creating blockholders, thereby reducing their incentives to exert effort. Therefore, while such regulations succeed in driving out value-destroying blockholders, they also subdue the disciplinary effect of prices as a result, and hence they may reduce firms’ total value. In contrast, rewarding long-termism (e.g., reducing long-term taxes) is more likely to increase firms’ total value, even if it simultaneously results in the entry of a higher number of value-destroying blockholders.

Mar
14
Mon
2022
Online Seminar by Burcu Esmer
Mar 14 @ 1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
Online Seminar by Burcu Esmer
Disclosure and lawsuits ahead of IPOs
by Burcu Esmer
University of Pennsylvania

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

We examine whether IPO registration disclosures expose firms to greater nonshareholder litigation risk. Using hand-collected data on lawsuits initiated at federal and state courts against IPO firms, we show that firms that submit their IPO registration statement with the SEC publicly experience a 16% increase in litigation risk between the registration filing and issuance date. Consistent with the public filing of the registration driving this heightened litigation risk, firms that file their registration confidentially under the JOBS Act do not experience such an increase in litigation risk. The effects of confidential filing are concentrated among business-initiated lawsuits, intellectual property/ contract lawsuits, and potentially meritless lawsuits. We find no disproportionate increase in post-IPO lawsuits for confidential filers, suggesting that withholding information during the IPO registration period mitigates litigation risk.

Mar
15
Tue
2022
Online Seminar by Altan Pazarbaşı
Mar 15 @ 1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
Online Seminar by Altan Pazarbaşı
“Cash Heterogeneity and the Payout Channel of Monetary Policy”
by Altan Pazarbaşı
Frankfurt School of Finance

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

This paper studies the role of corporate cash holdings in the transmission of monetary policy to equity payouts and risk premia. I document that cash-rich firms have higher equity payouts and higher stock prices in response to expansionary monetary policy surprises. Stock prices rise despite weak cash flow, investment, and credit responses to monetary policy, thus suggesting a tight link between observed firm values and the payout channel. I rationalize the empirical evidence in a New Keynesian model where firms finance investment with cash and equity issuance. Monetary easing weakens precautionary cash demand, leading cash-rich firms to allocate excess funds to shareholders optimally. Since payouts are pro-cyclical, cash-rich firms earn higher returns in expansionary periods. My findings stand against the view that the payout channel is undesirable.

Mar
18
Fri
2022
Online Seminar by Oğuz Acar
Mar 18 @ 1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
Online Seminar by Oğuz Acar
“Privacy, Autonomy and Beyond: The Psychology of Financial AI Adoption”
by Oğuz Acar
Bayes Business School (University of London)

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms are fundamentally transforming consumer finance. However, our knowledge on how consumers respond to AI-based financial products is limited. In this paper, we ask a novel question: what are the relative importance of psychological drivers of financial AI algorithm adoption? Drawing on two discrete choice experiments, we first show that psychological factors explain a larger percentage of adoption than the combined effect of price and performance. In addition, we find that auditability, a variable that is often neglected in prior literature, turns out to be a key psychological driver—a stronger predictor of adoption than more widely discussed AI features such as autonomy, personalisation, and understandability—and second only to privacy. Taken together, this study takes the first steps to shed light on relative importance of various psychological drivers—in contrast to past research that has focused on isolated impacts of individual factors—in the underexplored context of consumer financial decision making. Our simulations predicting adoption of AI-based financial products, as a function of its features, illustrates how practitioners could build on these insights. 

Mar
25
Fri
2022
Online Seminar by Michael Halling
Mar 25 @ 1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
Online Seminar by Michael Halling
“Primary Corporate Bond Markets and Social Responsibility”
by Michael Halling
University of Luxembourg

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

We document a robust, negative relation between corporate environmental and social (ES) performance and corporate bond issue spreads, even after controlling for ratings and other firm characteristics. Consistent with our theoretical model, this relation is due to bonds rated BBB or below, with spread-reductions of up to 98 basis points. These effects are predominantly related to product and employee scores. We do not find time trends for the ES-spread relation but document strong supply effects, as the share of issuers with good ES ratings has increased substantially. Finally, we provide evidence for a negative ES-credit-risk link.

Apr
1
Fri
2022
Online Seminar by Ece Tuncel
Apr 1 @ 4:00 pm – 5:00 pm
Online Seminar by Ece Tuncel
“I’m curious…Do negotiators have to give up value when the relationship matters?”
by Ece Tuncel
Webster University, St. Louis

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

In a ‘win-win bargaining’ strategy, negotiators attempt to maximize their own and their counterpart’s economic gains in order to build relational capital and trust. Yet in practice,negotiators often feel compelled to compromise their economic gains in an effort to reach an agreement and cultivate a longer-term relationship. It is generally believed that this kind of negotiation strategy is advantageous where relationships are key. In this research, we argue that curiosity forms a central negotiation tactic for managing economic and relational value; that is to say, curiosity introduces an emotional-motivational dimension to negotiations that allows negotiators to obtain both economic and relational gains. In a series of studies, we show that curiosity is an alternative to giving up economic value in negotiations and discuss the implications of our findings for future research.

Apr
15
Fri
2022
Online Seminar by Vasiliki Kostami
Apr 15 @ 1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
Online Seminar by Vasiliki Kostami
‘If You Love Your Agents, Set Them Free: Task Discretion in Online Workplaces’
by Vasiliki Kostami
HEC Paris

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

In manufacturing and service operations, flexibility is beneficial for matching supply with demand, but it comes at a cost. In modern digital workplaces, agents possess a spectrum of different skills associated with corresponding and variable task preferences: Some are inclined to give up part of their payment to avoid unfavorable matches. The platform manager, in turn, gains extra freedom in allocating tasks by possibly charging servers for a favorable assignment. Innovative marketplaces facilitate task discretion and seek for novel and beneficial implementations in the platform design. This naturally leads to the problem of exploring and optimizing the task allocation process. We introduce an innovative mechanism for task assignment in the workplace, and compare it against the traditional one where task routing is solely the platform’s decision. To improve all users’ welfare, agents are allowed some task discretion in exchange for a fee. We model different working environments and servers’ preferences via different distributions, and we study how the agents’ preferences, the task cost, and the flexibility fee, affect the equilibrium assignment. In a multi-server system, a server may request autonomy and choose the costly-to-the-platform option, considering the other agents’ behavior. Thereupon, it may or may not be beneficial for the platform when the agents’ and the platform’s preferences are misaligned. In every case, by pricing and offering flexibility the platform can do at least as well as the no-flexibility scheme. An important conclusion is that pricing task discretion can often improve the agents’ welfare and the labor platform’s profit.

Apr
22
Fri
2022
Online Seminar by Jessie Jiaxu Wang
Apr 22 @ 5:30 pm – 6:30 pm
Online Seminar by Jessie Jiaxu Wang
It’s Not Who You Know—It’s Who Knows You: Employee Social Capital and Firm Performance’
by Jessie Jiaxu Wang
Arizona State University

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

We show that the social capital embedded in employees’ networks contributes to firm value and provide evidence on the mechanisms. Using novel, individual-level network data, we measure a firm’s social capital derived from employees’ connections with external stakeholders. The directed nature of connections allows for identifying whether one party in a connection is a more valued contact. Results show that firms with more employee social capital perform better; the positive effect stems primarily from employees being valued by others. We provide causal evidence exploiting the enactment of a government regulation that imparted a negative shock to networking with specific sectors.

Apr
29
Fri
2022
Online Seminar by Özge Şahin
Apr 29 @ 4:00 pm – 5:00 pm
Online Seminar by Özge Şahin
‘Product Bundling: Assortment Selection in Scale and Consumer Behavior
by Özge Şahin
Johns Hopkins University

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

Bundle promotions can take various forms in how retailers offer them to the consumers (i.e., after a purchase incidence, as advertised deals or personalized promotions) and how they are structured (e.g., buy one get one free, spend $100 get 25% off or buy 3 get $20 off). They have become increasingly popular among brick-mortar and online retailers due to the potential in increasing revenue and profit. Designing an optimal set of bundle promotions in scale and understanding consumer response to these promotions are very relevant, but challenging problems. In this talk, we will share our findings from two working papers on the topic.

In the first paper, we study the optimal design of bundle promotion assortments in scale. The general bundle set selection problem is NP-hard. We develop pseudo-polynomial and polynomial-time algorithms for special cases of the problem. We use the insights from the special cases to develop a linear time approximation with a performance guarantee under some assumptions. We test our algorithms in medium to large instances and show that their performance is close to optimal. We also present insights on when bundle promotions are most useful to the firm by considering the interaction among products. 

In the second part of the talk, we present our empirical findings on how bundle promotions affect consumer purchase and return behavior compared to simple markdowns. Using the data from one of the largest apparel retailers in Turkey, we find that bundle promotions not only increase the purchase incidence for certain categories, but also decrease the return probability of products in the category, controlling for price, discount depth and item characteristics.

We find that returns of products offered with a bundle discount decrease on average by 10% to 24% for 20% to 40% bundle discount compared to returns of the same products if purchased with a regular percentage discount. We also show that accounting for the impact of bundle discounts on consumer returns significantly changes the optimal promotion strategy for the firm, and products assigned to bundle promotions. This translates to up to 4% increase in retailer’s profits compared to the promotion strategy that do not account for returns.

Joint work with Ali Fattahi, Sahar Hemmati, Wedad Elmaghraby

Bio: Ozge Sahin is a Professor of Operations Management and Business Analytics at the Johns Hopkins Carey Business School. She got her PhD and MS degrees in Operations Research from Columbia University. She is currently serving as the Faculty Director of Innovation Field Projects in the Johns Hopkins Carey Business School MBA Program. She teaches Operations Management, Business Analytics and Advanced Business Analytics in masters and MBA programs.

Her research interests include pricing, marketplace analytics with emphasis on consumer behavior, and strategic capacity and supply chain management. Some of her recent research projects include analysis of pricing strategies with consumer search cost, service pricing, identifying consumer biases and heuristics for sequential decision problems, conditional promotions in retail and pharmaceutical pricing. Ozge has published papers in academic journals including Management Science, Operations Research, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, among others. She serves as the Department Editor of Revenue Management and Pricing Area of Decision Sciences Journal, an Associate Editor for Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, and an Associate Editor for Operations Research. She served as a consultant to companies including Lucent Technologies, Amadeus SAS and Amazon. She is an Amazon Scholar in the Pricing Research and Machine Learning group at Amazon since 2019.

May
11
Wed
2022
Online Seminar by Marta Gasparin
May 11 @ 1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
Online Seminar by Marta Gasparin
‘Slow design-driven innovation: A response to our future in the Anthropocene epoch’
by Marta Gasparin
Copenhagen Business School

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

Human activities have changed the Earth System to the point where we are in a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene. This is characterized as a climate crisis with the practices and meanings associated with innovation being challenged. ‘Slow Designers’, including those living in the most climatically vulnerable parts of the Earth, are innovating design practices by building on the heritage and history of local communities and using eco-friendly materials. These craft-inspired approaches could mitigate our over reliance on the Earth System. Slow design-driven innovation (DDI), by translating communities’ heritage, history and territorial importance, creates sustainable products that customers love and care for.

May
20
Fri
2022
Online Seminar by Aytekin Ertan
May 20 @ 1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
Online Seminar by Aytekin Ertan
‘Unexpected Defaults: The Role of Information Opacity’
by Aytekin Ertan
London Business School

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/6834690808
Meeting ID: 683 469 0808

Abstract

Bond defaults are undesirable yet natural outcomes of risky investments. What is also crucial but hitherto underexplored is the unexpectedness of defaults. This notion is important because we observe that, compared to expected defaults, unexpected defaults are associated with worse recovery outcomes and more likely to adversely affect peer firms. We develop a parsimonious measure of default unexpectedness using bond price movements leading up to defaults. We next investigate the role of information opacity in this context and find that firms’ complex financial reporting language, opaque accounts, and weak voluntary disclosures increase default unexpectedness. From an external perspective, defaults occur more unexpectedly when rating agencies disagree with one another and when firms receive less media coverage. However, we also find instances in which opacity mitigates default unexpectedness—e.g., when transparency increases default unexpectedness by incentivizing investors to run. Overall, our paper introduces default unexpectedness as an economically relevant construct and highlight the role of corporate transparency in mediating unexpected defaults.